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Abstract
The dynamics of general relativity is encoded in a set of ten differen-
tial equations, the so-called Einstein field equations. It is usually believed
that Einstein’s equations represent a physical law describing the coupling of
spacetime with material fields. However, just six of these equations actu-
ally describe the coupling mechanism: the remaining four represent a set of
differential relations known as Bianchi identities. The paper discusses the
physical role that the Bianchi identities play in general relativity, and inves-
tigates whether these identities –qua part of a physical law– highlight some
kind of a posteriori necessity in a Kripkean sense. The inquiry shows that
general relativistic physics has an interesting bearing on the debate about the
metaphysics of the laws of nature.
Keywords: General relativity, laws of nature, necessity, Bianchi identi-
ties, Humeanism, background independence.
1 Introduction
The debate on the metaphysics of the laws of nature is huge. Philosophers do not
agree on whether there exist such things as laws of nature (see, e.g., van Fraassen,
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1989, for a radical antirealist position), let alone on what they are supposed to be.
In the present paper, I am going to circumscribe this immense conceptual space
by making two main working hypotheses. The first is that, in fact, there exist such
things as laws of nature, leaving open whether they are fundamental or reducible
to more fundamental features of reality. The second is that laws of nature properly
said are scientific laws and, more specifically, the laws of fundamental physics –
basically, the physicalists’ dream. One may or may not be sympathetic with these
two claims but, I hope, no one will contest the fact that they are at least plausible
assumptions.
However, this is still not enough to enclose the conceptual space into a tractable
area. In fact, we might encounter huge complications even by restricting ourselves
to the laws of fundamental physics. This is because the laws of quantum theory
–one of the pillars of modern physics– enjoy a rather unclear metaphysical status
(to put it mildly). Indeed, some claim that quantum theory as it stands is a genuine
description of how things behave in the world, while others are convinced that it
is not even a full-fledged theory, but just an algorithm for extracting experimental
predictions (see Maudlin, 2019, for an introduction to this debate and a defense
of the second position). Since I do not want this paper to get roped in the debate
about the interpretations of quantum theory, I will instead focus on the other pillar
of modern physics, namely, general relativity.
A final disclaimer: Throughout the text I am going to use the possible-world
terminology just as a useful conceptual tool, without committing myself to any
particular metaphysical stance regarding possible worlds.
Now that the field of inquiry has been reasonably restricted, I am ready to ask
the research question this paper is concerned with: Are the laws of general relativ-
ity necessary in any non-trivial, interesting sense? The way I am formulating the
question automatically cuts off from the picture instances of logical or conceptual
necessity (e.g. a bachelor is necessarily, that is, by definition, an unmarried man)
and nomic necessity (e.g. a physical body inhabiting a world where the physical
law L holds, necessarily behaves in accordance with L). What I am most inter-
ested in is, instead, whether Einstein’s equations bring to the fore any instance
of what Kripke would call a posteriori necessity, that is, necessary truths that we
can discover only by empirical investigation (cf. Kripke, 1980, especially pages
140-144).
Kripke famously argued that the truth of a certain class of statements, includ-
ing identity statements (e.g. “Water is H2O”, “Phosphorus is Hesperus”) and nat-
ural kinds characterization (e.g. “Potassium is an alkali metal”, “Cats are mam-
mals”), is necessary in a sense close to that of statements such as “Bachelors are
unmarried men”, yet not a priori in that such a truth has to be ascertained by look-
ing at the outside world. This type of necessity is enthralling to metaphysicians
since it highlights some sort of constraint on reality itself –i.e. some things being
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“defined” to be as they are and not otherwise.
Proponents of the regularity view of laws, in particular the Humeans, force-
fully deny that laws of nature possess any necessary connotation tout-court, let
alone the peculiar type envisaged by Kripke. For them, laws supervene on the
contingent arrangement of (local) states of affairs making up a world (see Hall,
2015, for a self-contained introduction to this stance). Hence, they deem entirely
possible to have a world where the laws of physics allow for potassium being in
fact a nonmetal.1
Surprisingly enough, this skepticism towards the necessity of laws of nature
is shared, though with some substantial divergencies, by “universals theorists” à
la Armstrong (e.g. Armstrong, 1983). Contrary to regularity theorists, universals
theorists do claim that the fact that it is a law in a world w that, say, all Fs are Gs
means that some sort of “necessitation” relation N holds between the universals
“F-ness” and “G-ness”. However, such a necessity just boils down to the fact
that if F is instantiated at w and N(F, ·) holds, then the second relatum of N is
necessarily G. Obviously, this does not imply that “N(F,G)” has to hold in all
possible worlds, not least because otherwise the universals of “F-ness” and “G-
ness” would become necessary beings (see Armstrong, 1983, chapter 11, and in
particular section 2, for a justification of this claim). Hence, although universals
theorists allow for some sort of necessity being at play in the laws of nature, they
nonetheless conceive of this necessitation as being of the nomic kind or a variant
thereof (and, for sure, much weaker than the one envisaged by Kripke).
However, there is an important reason to be suspicious of both regularity an
universals theories of laws, this reason being that both theories have troubles to
show how laws of nature support counterfactual reasoning (Fales, 1993, neatly
summarizes such concerns). In the regularity theory case, the fact that all Fs are
Gs is a law means that it is contingently true that “∀x (F (x)⇒ G(x))”. If we
denote by Ext(P) the extension of the predicate corresponding to the property P,
then the previous law statement just means that Ext(F ) is included in Ext(G).
Does this law support a counterfactual of the form “if an individual a had been F,
then it would have been G”? We immediately see the trouble here: if we enlarge
the content of Ext(F ) to include the counterfactual case where a is F, we are
substantially changing the facts upon which the truth of the above law statement
–qua contingent generalization– rests.
Universals theorists usually defuse the above challenge by pointing out that,
even if we add the “first-order” fact that a is F, we are not altering in any way the
“second-order” fact that F and G are N-related, against which the counterfactual
has to be evaluated. But there is another trouble that suggests itself at this point.
1As philosophically controversial as this view might be, it certainly makes for terrific science
fiction: Asimov (1972) is a wondrous example.
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If we take “N(F,G)” to be only contingently true, then the way this law supports
counterfactuals of the form “if something had been F, then it would have been G”
is rather feeble: Indeed, if N(F,G) holds, then the counterfactual is true. Other-
wise said, in order to evaluate this statement we have to hold fixed not only all
the particular aspects relevant to the situation in question, but also the law itself!
This makes the evaluation procedure suspiciously look like a matter of convention
rather than the assessment of an objective modal fact.
These troubles with counterfactuals are one of the reasons why some philoso-
phers entertain the much stronger idea that laws of nature are metaphysically nec-
essary in a Kripkean sense. For these people, once (if?) we will get to know the
true laws that govern our world, we will realize that they could not have been oth-
erwise. In other words, the laws of nature for these strong necessitarians constrain
not only physical but also metaphysical possibilities. This idea is generally imple-
mented through a causal theory of properties. For example, Shoemaker (1998),
puts it this way:
[T]he claim of the causal theory of properties is that the properties
that have causal features non-derivatively have them essentially, and
are individuated in terms of them. [footnote suppressed] I think this
comes to much the same thing as saying that the properties that enter
into causal laws have their causal features essentially, and are individ-
uated in terms of them.
(ibid., page 65)
So insofar as causal laws can be construed as describing the causal
features of properties, they are necessary truths. One way to get the
conclusion that laws are necessary is to [adopt the view] that laws are,
or assert, relations between properties.
(ibid., page 61)
Under this view, the claim that potassium is an alkali metal highlights a nec-
essary connection in nature in the sense that it is essential to potassium to behave
as an alkali metal and thus, for example, to violently interact with oxygen un-
der certain circumstances X. Note how this causal interaction between potassium
and oxygen can be rendered in terms of a relation holding between (an appropri-
ate subset of) properties borne by these two elements. A counterfactual situation
which holds fixed the conditions X but in which potassium does not interact with
oxygen is not only physically but also metaphysically impossible. Note also how
this counterfactual does not need the laws to be fixed as a matter of convention:
Given that they hold in all possible worlds, they are fixed as an objective modal
fact.
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The details through which this strong necessitarian strategy is implemented
may vary from author to author. For example, Shoemaker (Shoemaker, 1980)
maintains that the categorical basis of a property is distinct from its intrinsic causal
power, while Bird (cf. for example, Bird, 2005) endorses dispositional monism.
Ellis, instead, develops an essentialist account of the properties of natural kinds
(Ellis, 2001). Moreover, some authors –such as Fales (1990)– argue in favor of a
conceptual link between strong necessitarianism and Platonism.
For simplicity’s sake, here I will lump together all these variants under a
unique strong necessitarian view on laws of nature, and rephrase my original re-
search question as: To what extent –if any– do the laws of general relativity fulfill
the wishes of strong necessitarians?
2 The inciting incident: The Bianchi identities
The structure of the Einstein field equations (written in natural units such that




gµνR = 8πTµν[Φ, gµν] (µ, ν = 0, 1, 2, 3). (1)
The term on the right-hand side features the stress-energy tensor Tµν, which
depends on the metric tensor gµν and encodes information about the material dis-
tribution of the field(s) symbolized by Φ. For example, the mass-energy density
of Φ as measured by an arbitrary observer with 4-velocity uµ is ρΦ = uµTµνuν.
The stress-energy tensor satisfies the following important requirement:
T µν;µ = 0, (2)
where the semicolon indicates covariant differentiation with respect to the sub-
sequent index. The expression (2) can be seen as a weak local conservation law for
the energy-momentum of the material distribution. Roughly speaking, (2) states
that the amount of Φ’s energy-momentum enclosed in any infinitesimal volume
of spacetime is conserved. I called it weak conservation law because, less roughly
speaking, it is more of a “balance” law. To see this, we can rewrite (2) in extenso
using the definition of covariant derivative (a comma indicates ordinary differen-
tiation):




µρ = 0, (3)
where the second and third term of the sum depends on the components of the
connection (called Christoffel symbols), which defines the covariant derivative. In
2Here, for simplicity’s sake, I am disregarding the term featuring the cosmological constant.
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short, this relation just gives us a measure of how much the covariant derivative of
the stress-energy tensor differs from the ordinary one. It is interesting to point out
that, in a flat background spacetime, (3) can be interpreted as a measure of how
much energy-momentum fails to be conserved due to the presence of a gravita-
tional field. However, in general relativity, the “imbalance” due to the extra terms
in the sum is geometrized away as the curvature of spacetime (which means that
the “real” divergence of Tµν is given by the covariant derivative), so that the intu-
itive picture of energy-momentum being conserved in any infinitesimal volume of
(curved) spacetime holds (but see Hoefer, 2000, especially section 3, for a skepti-
cal take on this “received view”). Note however that, because of this discrepancy
between the covariant and the ordinary divergence of the stress-energy tensor, the
conservation law (3) cannot be converted into an integral law by using Gauss the-
orem –which holds for ordinary differentiation– and, hence, it cannot be extended
to finite spacetime regions, let alone to spacetime as a whole (unless spacetime
exhibits a highly symmetric structure).
Coming back to Einstein’s equations, the term on the left-hand side of (1)
encodes information about the geometry of spacetime. It is a linear combination
of different contractions of the Riemann curvature tensor Rµνσρ, which by itself
depends on the metric tensor gµν. This expression on the left-hand side also defines
the Einstein tensor Gµν:




In short, Einstein’s equations describe how a material distribution over a re-
gion of spacetime (or even the whole of spacetime, in the context of cosmology)
influences the geometry of spacetime (more precisely, its curvature) over that re-
gion and, in turn, how such a geometry constrains material motions in this region
through the geodesic equations of motion entailed by (1) (cf., for example., Mis-
ner et al., 1973, section 20.6, for a formal derivation of the equations of motion
for test particles from the field equations).
It is easy to realize that (1) is a rather dense way to summarize the laws of
general relativity. Indeed, given that the tensors appearing there can be written as
4 × 4 matrices, (1) can be “unpacked” into 16 equations. However, the matrices
|Gµν| and |Tµν| are symmetric, that is, for any element aµν of them (each element
being a function of spacetime points), it is the case that aµν = aνµ. This means that
just 10 Einstein’s equations are really needed, the other 6 being just redundant.
Another moment of reflection shows, however, that this can’t be right. If we
really had ten equations in ten unknowns gµν, that would mean that –just to have a
rough idea– we could set up an initial value formulation of the dynamics encoded
in (1) whose initial data would uniquely fix the components of the metric tensor
throughout the dynamical evolution –and, hence, uniquely fix a privileged coordi-
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nate system for the dynamical description– (see Wald, 1984, section 10.2, to catch
a glimpse of the high non-triviality of the initial value problem in general relativ-
ity). This would be a blatant violation of the general covariance of the theory, that
is, the fact that any solution of (1) can be specified up to an arbitrary choice of
four functions that represent a coordinate transformation xµ −→ xν (which is a
fancy way to say that we are free to write and solve (1) in any coordinate system
without loss of physical information).3 Fortunately, the issue dissolves once we
inspect the 10 equations and reveal that just 6 of them relate the spacetime geome-
try with the material distribution. The other 4 are mathematical relations involving
the Riemann curvature tensor, which go under the name of Bianchi identities:
Rµνσρ;δ + Rµνδσ;ρ + Rµνδρ;σ = 0; (5)
this “liberates” the four functions xν(xµ) that can hence be freely specified in the
initial data without altering the physical information encoded in a solution of (1).
This is the point where the physicist nods while the metaphysician raises the eye-
brow.
At first sight, it seemed that (1) straightforwardly described the coupling of
spacetime geometry with matter. Given that many different combinations 〈gµν,Tµν〉
–again, up to a coordinate transformation– are compatible with (1), this might
have led us to the conclusion that Einstein’s equations depict the contingent cou-
pling mechanism between geometry and matter. Otherwise said, each (equiva-
lence class of solutions under coordinate transformations) 〈gµν,Tµν〉 can be taken
to represent a possible state of affairs. Since nothing speaks against regarding all
these (equivalence classes of) solutions at least as genuine metaphysical possibil-
ities,4 our conclusion might have been that (1) contains no hint of metaphysically
interesting necessity. However, the fine-grained structure of (1) tells a slightly
different story.
In fact, the geometry/matter coupling is just a part of the laws of general rel-
ativity. The rest of the laws take the form (5), but these laws describe a set of
mathematical relations that the Riemann tensor obeys. Indeed, they were known
to mathematicians much before even just Einstein’s special theory was published
(the standard source is Bianchi, 1902, but a version of these identities was already
derived in Voss, 1880). And here comes the interesting part of the story: given
that (5) are mathematical identities, they hold by metaphysical necessity, that is,
3The expert readers already know that there is much more to say about the topic of general
covariance in general relativity. In section 4, I will lift just a bit the lid of this Pandora’s box.
4Some people might turn their noses up at those solutions containing closed timelike curves,
which they would consider patent metaphysical impossibilia. However, in order to be credible,
these people should provide some robust argument that justifies their taking general relativity
seriously except for these solutions. I will gloss over this issue, given that it is orthogonal to the
point I want to make in this paper.
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there is no possible world where they are not true; but, if they are integral part of
(1) in any interesting physical sense (that is, they describe some salient feature of
the world), mightn’t this mean that they “drag” the rest of the laws into a meta-
physically necessary status? The next step in my inquiry is to find out whether
there is in fact such an interesting physical sense.
3 The necessary path to Einstein’s equations: Mis-
ner, Thorne, and Wheeler
A possible reaction to this inciting incident could be to disregard the whole story
as evidence that philosophers sometimes tend to overthink things. Agreed, –the
objection would go– (5) are part of (1), but so what? Why can’t we dismiss (5)
as a byproduct of the formalism, as we did with the redundant part of (1)? After
all, the Bianchi identities are just a consequence of a representational choice, that
is, using the Riemann curvature tensor (which is symmetric) and its covariant
derivative. As Weatherall (2017, p. 27) puts it, the Bianchi identities are just a
“brute geometrical fact” about the divergence-freeness of the Einstein tensor (see
equation (11) below).5
However, not everybody shares this dismissive attitude. In fact, some of the
most prominent physicists who contributed to the development of general rela-
tivity since its inception think that the Bianchi identities are an essential part of
Einstein’s equations in a physical sense. Simply speaking, for these people, the
Bianchi identities are a key ingredient that makes it possible to couple spacetime
to matter. Using John A. Wheeler’s metaphor (Wheeler, 1990, pp. 106-107), the
Bianchi identities lie at the root of the “grip of spacetime” that “holds firmly onto
the content of [energy-momentum] in every [infinitesimal spacetime region]”, so
that it “bars any creation –or destruction– of [energy-momentum] anywhere in
spacetime”. According to Wheeler, the “magic” of this grip shows itself in a prin-
ciple encoded in the Bianchi identities, i.e. the principle that “the boundary of a
boundary is zero” (hereafter symbolized by ∂∂ = 0; see Misner et al., 1973, chap-
ters 15 and 17, for a thorough presentation, and Wheeler, 1990, chapter 7, for a
less technical but still informative introduction).
To have a rough idea of why the Bianchi identities encode the principle that
∂∂ = 0, imagine a very tiny (possibly infinitesimal) 3-cube C immersed in a
generic Riemannian manifold. Consider a vector Xµ with origin on one edge of C
and parallel transport this vector through the edges of the opposite face of C back
to its initial position (figure 1).
At the end of the transport procedure, the mismatch δXµ between the initial
5Many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for articulating this objection.
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Figure 1: Parallel transport of Xµ around one of C’s faces through its edges.
and final orientations of δXµ due to the curvature in that region is (in Riemann
normal coordinates6):
δXµ = Rµνyz(at x + ∆x)X
ν∆y∆z. (6)
If we instead perform this procedure on the face opposite to the one consid-
ered, we find:
δ′Xµ = −Rµνyz(at x)X
ν∆y∆z, (7)
where the minus sign stems from the fact that the direction of circulation of
Xµ on this face is opposite to the previous one. By (i) summing (6) and (7),
(ii) multiplying both sides by ∆x
∆x , and (iii) recalling how the standard derivative





Here comes the key insight. If we perform the parallel transport operation
through a circuit that comprises all the six faces of C, we immediately see that
Xµ passes through each edge of the cube twice, once in one direction, once in the










Figure 2: Direction of circulation through each face ofC. If we choose an arbitrary
origin for Xµ on a corner of C and we parallel transport it in a circuit through all
the six faces of the cube, the vector will pass through each edge twice, once in a
direction and once in the opposite one.
opposite one (figure 2). It is then easy to realize that δXµ = 0 in this case, that is,
all the curvature-induced changes of direction in Xµ cancel out. Hence, the sum
of the three terms of the form (8), corresponding to the contributions of the three





νzx,y = 0. (9)
If we now want to abandon the Riemann normal coordinates and rewrite (9)
in a generic coordinate system, all we have to do is to substitute ordinary deriva-
tives with covariant ones and swap the xyz indexes with the generic ones δσρ.
Therefore, in the end, we get exactly the Bianchi identities (5).
At this point, the connection between the Bianchi identities and the principle
that ∂∂ = 0 is very easily established. The elaborate procedure discussed above
gives a precise mathematical formulation of the fact that the interior of C is totally
enclosed by the two-dimensional boundary ∂C constituted by its faces, and this is
because all the edges of these faces –the one-dimensional boundary of the faces
themselves, or ∂∂C– are pairwise joint together, thus not showing any point to
the outside. But the boundary of ∂C, by definition, is the set of points whose
neighborhoods contain at least a point in ∂C and at least one point outside ∂C.
Hence, given that the edges have no “loose” point (in one dimension), the set ∂∂C
is empty. This result is valid for any closed surface in any dimension, hence the
generality of the principle that ∂∂ = 0.
Now that we grasped the relation between the Bianchi identities (5) and the
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principle that ∂∂ = 0, we need to clarify why and how such a principle is essential
to general relativity. To see this, we start by contracting (5) using the metric tensor




Rµνσρ;δ + Rµνδσ;ρ + Rµνρδ;σ
)
=




δ;σ = R;δ − 2R
σ
δ;σ = 0,




R;δ = 0. (10)













It is exactly at this point that general relativity breaks in. Indeed, the expres-
sion in parentheses above is just the definition of the Einstein tensor (4), which
means that the following holds:
Gσδ;σ = 0. (11)
In other words, the fact that the principle that ∂∂ = 0 holds implies that there
is a feature of geometry that is conserved (which is some sort of net curvature-
induced “moment of rotation” associated with a volume element, see Misner et al.,
1973, section 15.3), and such a feature is represented by the Einstein tensor. This
result was first proved using the language of exterior calculus by Élie Cartan (Car-
tan, 1983, chapter 8, section V 195).
A more pictorial representation of the information encoded in (11) and its
relation to the principle that ∂∂ = 0 is as follows (see Misner et al., 1973, sec-
tion 15.5, for the technical details). Consider a (infinitesimal) 4-cube C centered
around a spacetime point. The boundary of C, that is, ∂C, is constituted by eight
3-cubes (the hyperfaces of C), each of which has in turn a boundary constituted by
six 2-dimensional faces. Now, in order to calculate how much curvature-induced
moment of rotation is created (or destroyed) inside C, we need to sum the net
“flow” of such moment through ∂C, but (because of how this moment of rotation
was characterized in the discussion above) this means counting the contribution
of each 2-dimensional face of the eight cubes constituting ∂C twice, once with
one sign and once with the opposite sign. In the end, the amount of created (or
destroyed) moment of rotation inside C has to be zero by the principle that ∂∂ = 0,
which is what (11) states.
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By considering (11) alongside (2), we finally realize that, if we identify (up to
a constant) the moment of rotation inside any infinitesimal volume of spacetime
with its energy-momentum content, we automatically get Einstein’s equations.
Note how such an identification is not pulled out of thin air but is forced upon
us by the topological principle that ∂∂ = 0.8 This is exactly what Wheeler had
in mind when he wrote that the principle that ∂∂ = 0 is the “magic” behind the
“grip” of spacetime onto the mass-energy content of any infinitesimal spacetime
region. It is important to highlight how, in this story, the principle that ∂∂ = 0 (and
the ensuing Bianchi identities) seem to be regarded as concrete facts involving the
physical geometry of spacetime, rather than mere mathematical constructions.
But is this moment of rotation/energy-momentum identification choice “in-
evitable”, so to speak? In other words, isn’t it possible to find other divergence-
free rank-2 tensors that depend on the metric tensor in an appropriate way, so that a
different identification with the stress-energy tensor can be considered? If that was
the case, then much of the “magic” Wheeler speaks about would be lost because
the principle that ∂∂ = 0 would not single out (1) as the sole choice available.
This issue is settled by the theorem proven in Lovelock (1971, 1972), which
shows that, in four dimensions, the only divergence-free rank-2 tensor which de-
pends on the metric tensor and its first two derivatives is in fact the Einstein tensor
(besides, of course, the metric tensor itself, whose covariant derivative is triv-
ially zero by the requirement of compatibility with the affine connection).9 Curiel
(2019, section 7) strengthened this result by proving that it holds for any number
of spatiotemporal dimensions if we require that the tensor to be coupled with the
stress-energy tensor in fact possess the physical dimensions (not to be confused
with the spatiotemporal ones) of stress-energy –meaning that the coupling con-
stant is dimensionless. For clarity’s sake, it is important to note that the Bianchi
identities are not an explicit premise of Lovelock’s theorem, so it is fair to say
that Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler’s derivation of Einstein’s equations relies on
the Bianchi identities along with Lovelock’s theorem.
There is perhaps no better way to summarize all the above discussion than
with the evocative dialogue reported in Misner et al. (1973), p. 364:
Physics tells one what to look for: a machinery of coupling between
8At least, if we take the formal machinery of the theory as a faithful representation of the world
in a specific sense. I will discuss this point in the next section, where I will consider some criticism
to this attitude.
9Ehlers (1973b, p. 42) asks whether it is in principle possible to obtain an equation of the
form (1), where the divergence of the functional on the left does not vanish as a mere matter of
identity in gµν. The answer comes from the second Noether’s theorem, which implies that this
is not possible as long as the gravitational part of the action from which the field equations are
derived is generally covariant (see Brown and Brading, 2002, section IV, for a discussion of this
point).
12
gravitation (spacetime curvature) and source (matter; the stress-energy
tensor T) that will guarantee the automatic conservation of the source
(∇ · T = 0). Physics therefore asks Mathematics: “What tensor-like
feature of the geometry is automatically conserved?” Mathematics
comes back with the answer: “The Einstein tensor.” Physics queries:
“How does this conservation come about?” Mathematics, in the per-
son of Élie Cartan, replies: “Through the principle that the ‘boundary
of a boundary is zero’ ”.
4 A necessary connection between spacetime and mat-
ter?
At this point, it is quite clear how the strong necessitarians can use all of this to
their advantage. The first step would be to argue that both the Einstein and the
stress-energy tensors represent genuine properties borne by spacetime and matter
respectively. This step is quite easy to implement (see e.g. Swoyer, 1982, pages
206-207; but see also Lehmkuhl, 2011, for a critical discussion of this point),
especially considering that Gµν and Tµν are tensorial objects from which we can
extract crucial physical information about spacetime and matter (recall the exam-
ple of the mass-energy density made at the beginning of section 2).
The second step would then be to argue that these (sets of) properties are not
“inert”, but bear causal efficacy. A possible example of how this could be done is
the following:
Each spacetime point is characterized by its dynamical properties,
i.e. its disposition to affect the kinetic properties of an object at that
point, captured in the gravitational field tensor at that point. The mass
of each object is its disposition to change the curvature of spacetime,
that is to change the dynamical properties of each spacetime point.
Hence all the relevant explanatory properties in this set-up may be
characterized dispositionally.
(Bird, 2009, p. 240)
It is important to note that causal theories of properties, including disposition-
alism, are often criticized by pointing out that general relativity does not easily
accommodate the notion of causation. Here I will gloss over this debate, being
content to refer the interested reader to the recent discussion in Vassallo (2020,
section 2 in particular), and references therein. Instead, I will focus on an objec-
tion to strong necessitarianism –especially dispositional monism– that has a direct
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bearing on the debate about laws of nature. This objection is due to Stephen Mum-
ford (see Mumford, 2004, 2005), who is a realist about necessary connections but
not about laws –he coined the term realist lawlessness to describe his position.10
Mumford starts by arguing that laws can be taken metaphysically seriously
only insofar as they have an active role in determining the phenomena they are
said to govern. For him, claiming that a law L entirely depends on11 the entities
and events making up the history of a given world w amounts to saying that L does
not exist at w. This is because L does not determine w’s history in any way (it is
in fact the other way round), so it can be brushed away from the metaphysical
analysis, given that it does not do any relevant explanatory job.
This evidently raises a challenge to strong necessitarian theories that construe
laws as dependent on causal properties. The challenge can be summarized by a
simple question: how can real laws determine the very things they depend on?
This challenge particularly impacts dispositionalists à la Bird, who are nomologi-
cal realists and claim that laws depend on the dispositional essences possessed by
objects. In the present context, Mumford’s argument implies that going for a dis-
positionalist account of spatiotemporal and material properties would undermine
the lawhood and necessity of (1).
In order to counter Mumford’s challenge, one may try to argue that what laws
depend on is in fact distinct from that which is governed. Let us see how this
argument may go.12 First of all, it is important to clarify how laws depend on
dispositional essences. Simply speaking, if an object O possesses an essentially
dispositional property P then, necessarily, it would show a characteristic mani-
festation M whenever it receives an appropriate stimulus S .13 This leads to the
statement “for all Os, if O has P and receives S , then it shows M”. This statement
has the hallmark of a law-like generalization based on P. The dependence of the
law on P is quite easy to spot: In order to have a different law, the disposition P
must be different as well. Hence, it is plausible to maintain that laws supervene
on dispositions.
Now note that (i) dispositions are distinct from the set of events in which
such dispositions manifest under certain stimuli. Roughly speaking, the existence
10To be fair, Mumford’s original argument targets all kinds of nomological realists. In fact, he
argues that nomological realists have to face a “Central Dilemma” that leads to conceptual troubles
irrespective of which horn is chosen (Mumford, 2004, chapter 9). Here I will focus just on the horn
that affects strong necessitarians.
11Mumford claims that it is immaterial to the argument whether such a dependence is superve-
nience, reduction, or even constitution (see Mumford, 2004, section 9.7).
12In the following, I am drawing from Bird’s reply to Mumford reported in French (2006, pp.
441-454), which is a review symposium of Mumford (2004).
13For simplicity’s sake, I will not consider chancy dispositions here, given that Einstein’s equa-
tions are not stochastic. The present discussion is easily generalizable to this type of dispositions
though.
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of dispositions does not depend on the existence of their manifestations, so the
manifestation events can be regarded as “external” to dispositions. Moreover, (ii)
dispositions determine the set of manifestation events in a straightforward sense:
Trivially, a dispositional essence P makes it the case that should O possess P and
experience S then there will be M.
Since laws supervene on dispositions, (i) implies that manifestation events are
external to laws too. Moreover, from (ii), laws acquire a substantial metaphysical
import in virtue of the fact that they supervene on something that determines (part
of) the world’s history –i.e. dispositions governing manifestation events. In this
way, the challenge is defused: The dispositional essences of objects guarantee
–pace Mumford14– that certain law-like generalizations, such as (1), necessarily
hold and do a relevant explanatory job.
If the above response is sound, then the third and final step of the necessitarian
strategy would be to show that it is in fact essential for spatiotemporal proper-
ties to determine the motion of matter and for material properties to change the
curvature of spacetime. This step amounts to arguing that the symmetric rela-
tion “N(Gµν,Tµν, )” encoded in (1), which conveys the mutual causal behavior of
spacetime and matter, holds by metaphysical necessity. Here is where appealing
to the whole story told in section 3 would give a huge payoff to the strong neces-
sitarians. According to this story, if we discover by empirical investigation that
“N(Gµν,Tµν, )” holds, we have to conclude that it holds by metaphysical neces-
sity. This is because a world where spatiotemporal properties as modelled by Gµν
and material properties as modelled by Tµν are not N-related is a world where the
principle that ∂∂ = 0 and Lovelock’s theorem do not hold, which is an impossible
state of affairs. Therefore, if “N(Gµν,Tµν, )” qua empirical statement involving the
mutual causal behaviour of spacetime and matter is true, this truth is metaphysi-
cally necessary. Note how this is a particular case of a Kripkean necessary truth
involving natural kinds’ characterization: the N-relation basically “defines” what
it is for something to be spacetime or matter.
One might argue that it is conceivable to have counterfactual situations where
a slight modification of (1) holds, with the value of the coupling constant being a
bit different from the actual one. In these situations, Gµν and Tµν would still repre-
sent spacetime and matter, but now their causal role would be a bit different from
the actual one, which shows that, in fact, the N-relation does not define in any
interesting metaphysical sense what it is for something to be matter or spacetime
(see Sidelle, 2002, for a general articulation of this anti-necessitarian argument,
14Actually, Mumford is not at peace with this response at all. For him, in the above sketched
account of laws, all the metaphysically substantial work is done by dispositions, with laws being
demoted to some counterfactuals made true by dispositions themselves. Hence, what supervenes
on dispositions does not deserve to be called “law” (see his reply to Bird reported in French, 2006,
pp. 463-464).
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and Shoemaker, 1998, especially sections 2 and 6, for a reply). Strong necessi-
tarians would react to this argument by pointing out that the coupling constant
is an integral part of the relation N, which defines the (causal) nature of the spa-
tiotemporal and material properties, so slight modifications of its values –although
conceivable– are not metaphysically possible.
That being said, the opponents of strong necessitarianism would still not find
the above sketched strategy particularly compelling. They may reply that the prin-
ciple that ∂∂ = 0 and Lovelock’s theorem single out general relativity as the
only possible metric theory of gravity under certain specific conditions. In fact,
by relaxing such conditions in one way or another, we end up with a plethora
of alternative metric theories of gravity, some of which would count as more or
less straightforward extensions of general relativity (see Clifton et al., 2012, for a
comprehensive review of these approaches, and Baker et al., 2013; Lagos et al.,
2016, 2017, for a general framework that groups together these extensions as a
parametrized family of theories). Why shouldn’t these theories be regarded as de-
scribing genuine metaphysical possibilities? If we agree with this, then we would
have to accept a proliferation of possible worlds where (1) strictly speaking do
not hold. Some of these worlds would in fact feature sets of properties described
by Gµν and Tµν, without them being N-related. This would be enough at least to
“lower” the kind of necessitation involved in (1) to an Armstrong-like nomic type:
In all possible worlds where Gµν represents spatiotemporal properties and Tµν rep-
resents material properties under the appropriate conditions, the laws of general
relativity necessarily hold.
In order to assess the strength of this objection, it is important to clearly state
the conditions under which the “path” to a metric theory of gravity discussed in the
previous section ceases to be the only one practicable. Following the discussion
in Clifton et al., 2012, section 2.4.1, we can “dodge” the conclusion of Lovelock’s
theorem, and hence construct a metric theory of gravity different from general
relativity, whenever we choose at least one of these options:
i. Consider a space with dimensionality different than four.15
ii. Consider other degrees of freedom or fields beyond (or rather than) those of
general relativity.
iii. Accept higher than second order derivatives of the metric field in the field
equations.
iv. Give up on rank-2 tensor field equations.
15Under the light of the already mentioned result in Curiel (2019) this is made possible by
allowing a dimensionful coupling constant, which would compensate for the fact that the tensor to
be equated to the stress-energy one does not have the physical dimensions of stress-energy.
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v. Give up on the symmetry of the field equations under exchange of indices.
vi. Give up on divergence-free field equations.16
We now see that the above objection against strong necessitarians seems quite
incisive. While, in fact, strong necessitarians can always respond by saying that
each of the options above amounts to denying some essential feature of spacetime
or matter17 (thus constituting a metaphysically impossible condition), it is evident
that this requires from them a lot more argumentative effort than that implied
prima facie by the three-step strategy sketched at the beginning of this section. In
other words, the above objection shows that strong necessitarians have to accept
and justify quite a number of carefully tailored essential features of reality in order
to make sure that the options (i) to (vi) are not metaphysically viable.
Even if the above criticism sounds penetrating, still nothing prevents the strong
necessitarians from shrugging it off just by biting the bullet. Agreed, their reply
might go, in order to avoid (i) to (vi) from being genuine possibilities one must
argue that many facts regarding spacetime and matter (e.g. spacetime having four
dimensions) are necessary a posteriori. But so what? The physical world is ex-
tremely complex, and it encompasses an exorbitant amount of facts. So, even if
just a small subset of these physical facts are necessary, still they will very likely
be a huge number. In particular, the fact that spacetime and matter possess many
essential features –which bar (i) to (vi) from being metaphysically viable options–
is no surprise given the tremendous amount of structure that is grouped under the
terms “spacetime” and “matter”, so it would be unfair to accuse the strong neces-
sitarians of inflating and fine-tuning their metaphysics in order to render modified
gravity theories metaphysically impossible. Therefore, the most that the above
objection shows is that the strong necessitarians have some work to do in order to
defend their view, not that such a view is inherently untenable or ad hoc.
In order to get a better grasp of the kind of argumentative work that the strong
necessitarians have to go through, let us focus on a concrete example. Consider
option (vi) above: This option is compatible with claiming that there are possible
worlds where the conservation law (2) for the field source does not hold and,
hence, the discussed coupling of spacetime and matter made at the level of Gµν;µ =
T µν;µ = 0 cannot be established there.
16A further possibility would be to derive the field equations from an action containing terms
that are not functions of the fields or their derivatives evaluated at a single point in spacetime. I
will set aside this “non-locality” option for simplicity’s sake, given that it is not crucial for the
discussion.
17Perhaps it would be more accurate to claim that these options misrepresent spacetime and
matter. However, I will gloss over this aspect, given that it is not central to the point at stake. The
reader interested in the topic of scientific representation can refer to Frigg and Nguyen (2020), and
references therein.
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The strong necessitarians can challenge this claim by mentioning a result due
to Dirac (see Dirac, 1975, section 30; Brown and Brading, 2002, section V), which
in a nutshell amounts to saying that the condition (2) is automatically fulfilled by
any type of material source once we require that the material part of the action18
– from which we get the field equations/equations of motion for our theory by ex-
tremization – has to be generally covariant. Most importantly, this result does not
depend on the form of the action itself, but just on its covariance under arbitrary
coordinate transformations.
It is easy to see what it is, which the Dirac’s result highlights, and which
the strong necessitarians can use to strengthen their case. Simply speaking, the
condition (2) is so weak that coming up with a state of affairs that violates it
would involve an extremely malicious and ad hoc tweaking of a world.19 For the
strong necessitarian, this would be a red flag signalling that we are messing up
with something essential about matter (and spacetime).
Against this strong necessitarian line of reasoning based on Dirac’s result, one
might question the physical import of the requirement of general covariance for
the action. This position goes back to Kretschmann (1917), who showed that any
theory can be rendered generally covariant with some appropriate mathematical
manipulations. To this, the strong necessitarians can react first of all by question-
ing whether general covariance in general relativity is really devoid of physical
import. The status of general covariance in general relativity is in fact a vexata
quaestio in the philosophy of spacetime physics (see, e.g. Norton, 1993; Pooley,
2010, to catch a glimpse of the debate; but see also Norton, 2003 for an attempt
at reconciling the opposing parties), but the important point here is that strong
necessitarians can endorse the claim that general covariance in general relativity
is physically substantive in the sense that it expresses a local gauge freedom of the
theory – which makes general relativity a full-fledged gauge theory of gravity.
By going for the “general relativity as a gauge theory of gravity” story, the
strong necessitarians would add a further arrow to their quiver against those who
question the physical import of the Bianchi identities. In a nutshell, gauge the-
ories are field theories (classical and quantum) whose dynamics is encoded in
a Lagrangian (from which the action is constructed) which is invariant under a
group of local (that is, depending on a number of arbitrary functions of space-
time) transformations specific for each theory. The structure of gauge theories has
proved itself to be extremely powerful, to the point that the entirety of modern
fundamental physics successfully describes the world by means of gauge theo-
18The other part being the gravitational one.
19As Trautman (1962, section 5-1) clearly points out, the condition T µν;µ = 0 holds even when
stronger conservation laws for T µν –either differential or integral– do not. Hence, it may very well
be the case that (2) still holds in a “crazy” world where nothing is in fact conserved in the stronger
sense usually adopted in physics.
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ries (see Healey, 2007 for a nice philosophical discussion, and O’Raifeartaigh
and Straumann, 2000, for a brief but enlightening historical treatment). Now, as
Noether’s second theorem shows, any theory which is invariant under a contin-
uous group of transformations depending on n arbitrary functions of spacetime
exhibits an interdependence of its field equations/equations of motion encoded in
n differential identities, which implies that any solution of said equations are de-
termined up to n freely specifiable functions (cf., for example, Trautman, 1962,
section 5-2 and Brading and Brown, 2003, section 5.2). The particular case which
involves the general covariance group with n = 4 is nothing but the case of gen-
eral relativity, the 4 differential identities being exactly the Bianchi identities (5).
Noether’s result together with the huge empirical success of gauge theories are,
in the eyes of the strong necessitarians, a further clue of the physical significance
and metaphysical inevitability of the story told in section 3. Also in this case, the
opponents might claim that it is just a contingent fact that gauge theories are suc-
cessful in our world, while the strong necessitarians would defend the thesis that
a possible world has to possess a gauge-theoretic structure by using arguments
similar to those used to argue that, say, water has to possess its actual molecu-
lar structure. From this point on, the challenge returns to a purely metaphysical
battlefield, which we are not interested to step on in this paper.
Instead, another metaphysically interesting yet physically-related aspect of the
debate that still needs to be addressed is the following: Is it possible to construe
general relativity in a way that sidesteps the “necessary path” walked by Misner,
Thorne, and Wheeler (and Cartan, before them)?
5 Einstein’s equations from a contingent state of af-
fairs: Ehlers, Pirani, and Schild
Many readers may object that the presentation in section 3 looks awkwardly
upside-down. For them, that section purportedly shown how Einstein’s equations
are immediately established as a matter of geometry once the weak conserva-
tion of the source of spacetime curvature is assumed, whereas in fact it is the
exact opposite: If the laws of general relativity hold, then the coupling of matter
with spacetime can be given the nice geometric representation elicited by Cartan’s
work. This skeptic attitude naturally fits a Humean reading of the laws of general
relativity.20 According to this reading, (1) supervene on the mosaic of matters of
20As in the case of necessitarianism, also Humeanism comes in different flavors. Among these
different approaches, it is worth mentioning Earman and Roberts (2005); Cohen and Callender
(2009); Esfeld et al. (2018). Here I will brush over these differences, given that they are not vital
for the discussion.
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particular fact that contingently obtain at our world, in the sense that these laws
belong to the simplest yet most informative deductive system that successfully
describes the mosaic (the so-called best system). This point of view is radically
anti-necessitarian in that it does not presuppose any modal connection whatsoever
among the facts in the mosaic: Everything might have been otherwise. Under this
picture, the hint of necessity encoded in the Bianchi identities is totally washed
away, in the sense that (5) qua part of the physical law (1) hold just in virtue of
it being a theorem of the best system for a general relativistic world. In other
words, (5) do not “force” things to be in a certain way; on the contrary, the fact
that some contingent state of affairs obtains makes it possible for them to be best
described in terms of (5). In the physical literature there are several approaches
that seek to construe general relativity –and especially its geometric machinery–
from some underlying non-inherently geometric states of affairs (for example, Ja-
cobson, 1995, and Padmanabhan, 2010, chapter 16, attempt at deriving general
relativity from thermodynamic phenomena). Here I will focus my attention on
a particular framework put forward by the physicists Ehlers, Pirani, and Schild
(Ehlers et al., 1972), which has the remarkable feature of being cast in terms of
a deductive axiomatic system, thus making its Humean reading rather straightfor-
ward.
In a nutshell, the authors propose an axiomatic system based on the primitive
notions of light ray and freely falling particle, which is able to recover the Rie-
mannian geometry of general relativity. It is important to note that this choice of
primitives is not conceptually forced upon us by the need to recover Riemannian
geometry: For example, Synge (1960, especially chapters II and III) suggests to
take the notions of particle and clock as primitives. Going back to Ehlers, Pirani,
and Schild, their approach supplies a list of axioms, in their words, “suggested
by experience” (Ehlers et al., 1972, section 2) that the set of light rays L and the
set of freely falling particles P (being two subsets of the set of all events M) have
to obey in order to define, respectively, a conformal and a projective structure
over M. The first structure permits to define the notions of timelike, lightlike,
and spacelike vectors (infinitesimal light cone structure), while the second sup-
plies a notion of parallel transport and, hence, of affine geodesic. Another axiom
requires these two structures to be compatible, that is, that all light rays are (light-
like) geodesics. The set M = (L, P) endowed with these two compatible structures
is called by the authors Weyl space (thus acknowledging the seminal work of the
German mathematical physicist; see, e.g., Weyl, 1918). The rest of their work is
meant to show how, by supplying some more axiomatic conditions, a Weyl space
can be reduced to a Riemannian space with a full metric structure.
Here I am not concerned with the technical details of Ehlers, Pirani, and
Schild’s framework. Rather, I am interested in establishing a connection between
their work and the Humean framework. Such a connection is indeed easy to estab-
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lish: Their work suggests how to get the machinery of Riemannian geometry out
of a mosaic of material particles’ and photons’ trajectories. This is exactly what
the Humeans were searching for: A way to show that Riemannian geometry is not
inherent into the physical world –thus (modally) constraining facts within it– but,
instead, it is a useful tool to describe the contingent happenings in the mosaic.
Thus, for example, there can be “crazy” possible worlds where this description of
the mosaic in geometric terms is not viable. This is enough for the Humeans to
resist the necessitarian push that comes with Wheeler, Thorne, and Misner’s story
about general relativity.
Just to be clear, this is not to claim that the Humeans want to eschew spa-
tiotemporal properties and relations from the mosaic – to the contrary, they firmly
believe in the inherent spatiotemporality of worlds like ours (to appreciate the piv-
otal role that spatiotemporal relations play in the Lewisian/Humean framework,
see in particular Lewis, 1986, section 1.6). Instead, what the Humeans want to
eradicate from the picture is any hint of geometric necessity associated to the spa-
tiotemporal nature of the mosaic. Hence, say, they are totally willing to accept
that three material objects A, B,C inhabiting our world are spatially related so that
their distances fulfill the triangle inequality; what they resist is instead the claim
that it might have not been the case that A, B,C (co-)existed yet they were not
related in a way satisfying the triangle inequality. In fact, they would claim, far
away from our modal horizon there is a rather strange world where this is exactly
the case. Such a world might not even feature spatiotemporal relations properly
said, as long as they are substituted by “spatiotemporally analogical” relations
which are –as discussed in Lewis (1986, pp. 75-76)– (i) natural (i.e. not gerry-
mandered), (ii) pervasive (in the above example, if A is related to B, and B to
C, then there is also a relation linking A and C directly), (iii) discriminating (if a
possible world is large enough, then the relations may be enough to individuate
uniquely the relata), and (iv) external (i.e. they do not supervene on the intrinsic
features of the relata taken individually). Note how none of these four minimal
requirements presupposes or implies the triangle inequality.
That being said, a moment of reflection shows that, in the context of general
relativity, the Humeans might have an Achilles’ heel.21 Such a potential vulner-
ability is indirectly highlighted by the assessment that Ehlers himself gave of his
framework:
This approach shows how quantitative measures of time, angle and
distance, and a procedure of parallel displacement [...] can be ob-
tained constructively from ‘geometry-free’ assumptions about light-
rays and freely falling particles; pseudo-Riemannian (or Weylian) ge-
ometry is recognized even more clearly than before as the appropriate
21To my knowledge, this worry was firstly voiced in Vassallo and Esfeld (2016, section 5).
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language for a generalized kinematics which allows for the unavoid-
able and ever-present ‘distortions’ called gravitational fields.
(Ehlers, 1973a, p. 81, my emphasis)
Otherwise said, the above sketched procedure yields single models 〈gµν,Tµν〉
of (1), depending on the particular arrangement of trajectories, but it is not clear
whether it captures the so-called background independence of the theory –i.e. the
fact that spacetime is dynamical, and not just a fixed arena where the dynamics
of matter unfolds (see, e.g., Giulini, 2007, for a in-depth analysis of this tricky
concept).
To have a better idea of the issue at stake, we can formulate it as a simple
question: Is it possible for the Humeans to capture the background independence
of general relativity by looking at the (entire) mosaic? In other words, granted that
the Humeans can recover the specific geometry g̃µν of spacetime and the specific
distribution T̃µν of matter from the mosaic obtaining at a world w, are they able to
discern whether w is a cosmological model 〈g̃µν, T̃µν〉 of general relativity (where
spacetime is a “dynamic partner” of matter) or a world in which the material
distribution T̃µν just inhabits a fixed background that happens to be g̃µν? If the
Humeans cannot answer these questions in the positive, this might hint at the
fact that, after all, it is not the full laws of general relativity that supervene on a
mosaic but, at most, just a particular instance of them. It is easy to see that such a
potential problem for the Humeans does not stem from Ehlers, Pirani, and Schild’s
approach to general relativity per se but it is built into the theory, so to speak. The
necessitarians would be happy to point out that such a problem does not arise if
we introduce genuine modal features –e.g. in the guise of causal properties– in
the mosaic. In this way, in fact, the co-variation of spacetime and matter encoded
in (1) is easily accounted for.
The Humeans can defuse this challenge by pointing out that, if w is a general
relativistic world, then g̃µν and T̃µν cannot be the simplest and most informative
descriptions of matters of fact in the mosaic at w without the correlations under-
lying (1) being part of the best system as well. Let us consider this response in
more detail.
In physically realistic situations, we expect g̃µν and T̃µν to have very compli-
cated forms (imagine how complex the detailed description of the geometry of our
world might be), so these mathematical formulae are viable only insofar as they
are the simplest and strongest descriptions that make it possible for the best system
at w to express the entailment of counterfactuals of the form “had the particles’
and photons’ trajectories been distributed in such and such a way, the spacetime
geometry and energy-momentum distribution would have been such and such”.
Note that it is these counterfactuals that supply the kind of information that cap-
tures the co-variation of spacetime and matter encoded in (1). Now, if the best
22
system at w did not entail any such counterfactuals (or just some of them), thus
failing to capture (1), then the simplicity and strength of g̃µν and T̃µν would be-
come dubious: At that point, for example, why shouldn’t a much simpler metric
and a more complicated stress-energy tensor be the simplest and strongest choices
overall? Of course, this does not rule out the possibility of a world w′ where the
uncorrelated g̃µν and T̃µν are in fact part of the best system; but such a world would
be much “messier” than w (and any other general relativistic world) in an empir-
ically detectable way. In short, the fact about whether g̃µν and T̃µν are correlated
or not has to boil down to empirical facts about the mosaic that the best system is
certainly able to capture in the form of the above mentioned counterfactuals, so it
is out of question that there can be an ambiguity between 〈g̃µν, T̃µν〉-correlated and
〈g̃µν, T̃µν〉-uncorrelated at a given world (at least, in physically realistic situations).
Obviously, the fact that the best system at w entails certain counterfactuals
does not mean that some primitive modal notion is being smuggled into the mo-
saic at w. The Humeans have no problem in grounding counterfactual reasoning
in inherently non-modal facts (e.g., in an ontology of individuals endowed with
non-modal properties), and this can be equally achieved by modal realists à la
Lewis (Lewis, 1986, section 1.2) as well as modal fictionalists à la Divers (Divers,
1999). It has to be pointed out, however, that accounting for counterfactual rea-
soning in general relativity may be tricky, since the absence of fixed background
spatiotemporal structures that “persist” across possible worlds22 makes it difficult
to establish a reliable reference for trans-world identification of things (be it ma-
terial objects or spatiotemporal points and regions), which is required to assess
counterfactual change (see Curiel, 2015, for a clear articulation of the problem,
and Vassallo, 2020, sections 4 and 5, for an alternative framework for counter-
factual reasoning that may be viable in general relativity). Clearly, this particular
issue impacts also the necessitarians, whose characterization of causal properties
involves counterfactual reasoning.
In conclusion, there seems to be no prima facie reason to think that the Humeans
may be in trouble with the background independence of general relativity. Hence,
the onus is on the necessitarians to show that there can be general relativistic mo-
saics that fail to pick out (1) unless some primitive modal features are introduced
in it.
22For example, all possible worlds in which special relativity holds feature Minkowski space-
time, so this structure “persists” across this cluster of worlds. See, e.g., Vassallo (2016, section 3)
for a characterization of background structures in terms of possible worlds.
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6 Conclusion
General relativity surely represents a favorable environment for necessitarians
about laws of nature. In particular, strong necessitarians can very much profit
in defending their views from the “metaphysical rigidity” that the theory brings
into the world by virtue of geometrical facts becoming physical facts in the strong
sense entailed by (1). The most patent example is that of the Bianchi identities,
which general relativity seems to promote from mathematical to physical truths
entailing the conservation of a physical feature of reality described by the Ein-
stein tensor. However, as we have seen in section 4, implementing a strong neces-
sitarian strategy that exploits Misner, Thorne, and Wheeler’s “necessary path” to
general relativity is not as straightforward as one might have expected.
Of course, these necessitarian efforts do not move those metaphysicians more
rooted in the empiricist tradition. For them, the necessitarians’ enthusiasm just
stems from taking too seriously –in a quasi Platonist fashion– the formal machin-
ery of general relativity and gauge theories in general, which heavily relies on
differential geometry. The empiricist skepticism is rather simple: Since all mea-
surements always boil down to observations of material facts, and never of purely
geometric facts, there must be a way to show that geometry is just a useful way to
describe the behavior of material systems. The pulp of this skepticism is usually
enclosed in a Humean shell. As discussed in section 5, the Humeans can indeed
point out that the laws of general relativity can be derived from contingent states
of affairs with no hint of geometric necessity in them. Necessitarians may try to
undermine the Humeans’ confidence by devising some malicious cases in which
(1) fail to supervene on such a mosaic but, as things stand, it is not clear if and to
what extent these cases may be really problematic.
In the end, even if the discussion carried out in this paper does not decisively
shift the metaphysical balance towards any of the parties involved, still it high-
lights how reflecting on the nature of Einstein’s equations helps sharpening and
deepening the broader debate about the laws of nature.
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